INTRODUCTION
In 1959, Mrs. Ethel West Cotnam of Alabama won a ground breaking lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed her to subtract her legal fees, paid to her lawyer on a contingency basis, from her gross income.1 Mrs. Cotnam sued the estate of her former employer when the administra tor refused to honor the decedent's promise to pay her one-fifth of his estate if she would care for him the rest of his life.2 Upon the success ful disposition of this suit,3 the Supreme Court of Alabama awarded Mrs. Cotnam $120,000.4 Of that amount, $50,365.83 went to her attor-ney, and the Internal Revenue Service determined she owed $36,985.02 in taxes.5 The Tax Court upheld this decision.6 Mrs. Cotnam appealed, claiming she possessed no control over the funds diverted to her attorney, and that, once she signed the contingent-fee contract,7 she never could lay claim to the money.8 In a two-to-one decision, the Fifth Circuit agreed, reasoning that, because Mrs. Cotnam never · enjoyed the benefit of this alleged income, it in f act did not constitute income as to her.9 This decision created a split between the circuits10 that has irked the Internal Revenue Service and a majority on the Tax Court to this day.11
For nearly forty years, the Fifth Circuit stood alone in holding that plaintiffs can subtract attorneys' fees from gross income.12 The major ity of circuit courts, less sympathetic to those in Mrs. Cotnam's posi tion, 13 distinguished her case based on the unique attributes of the attorney charging-lien statute under which her lawyers collected.14 In their view, a contingent-fee agreement constitutes nothing more than an anticipatory assignment of income, whereby the taxpayer transfers his or her right to income to someone else in order to decrease tax liability. 15 The taxpayer remains firmly in control of the income- [Vol. 101:1102 generating vehicle, the lawsuit, and merely directs the proceeds to another, either in order to satisfy a debt,16 or to divert the funds to someone in a lower tax bracket.'7 Under such an analysis, taxpayers do possess dominion over the portion of their awards going toward legal fees. They have simply chosen to direct these ·proceeds to others in order to settle debts or lower their tax burden.18 Although taxing suc cessful litigants in this manner may seem unfair, a number of circuits have made it clear that, because Congress remains in control of tax policy, the courts should not make ad hoc adjustments in an attempt to promote equity.19
Rejecting this analysis, the Sixth Circuit, in 2000, decided to follow 18. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 116 (stating that taxpayers realize a gain when they exchange the power to receive income for something of economic worth). 24. hi. at 856. The common law attorney lien: was a device invented by the courts for the protection of attorneys against the knavery of their clients, by disabling clients from receiving the fruits of recoveries without paying for the valuable services by which the recoveries were obtained. The lien was never enforced like other liens. If the fund recovered was in possession or under the control of the court, it would not allow the client to obtain it until he had paid his attorney. and in administering the fund it would see that the attorney was protected. If the thing recovered was in a judgment, and notice of the attorney's claim had been given, the court would not allow the judgment to be paid to the prejudice of the attorney.
weight to this issue, the court noted, "Michigan law operates in more or less the same way as the Alabama lien in Cotnam."25 Thus, the court refused to require any statutory grant of power to the plaintiff's attor ney over the judgment award before finding that the plaintiff lacked sufficient control over the portion paid to the attorney to avoid tax on this amount. This Note argues that plaintiffs assign a portion of their cause of action to their attorneys when they sign contingent-fee agreements. Part I argues the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine is inap plicable to contingent-fee agreements. Part II contends the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have already implicitly held that plaintiffs assign a portion of their claims to their attorneys upon signing contingent fee agreements, and explains why this approach is correct. Part III concludes that section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code -property transferred in connection with performance of services -is ill suited to contingent-fee arrangements, and supports a barter analysis for determining the tax liability of each party. (MIS)APPLYING THE ANTICIPATORY ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME
DOCTRINE
This Part examines the anticipatory assignment of income theory applied by courts in the majority from two perspectives -paying off a debt by assigning income previously earned, and the actual enjoyment of the income test -and finds both inapplicable to contingent-fee situations. Section I.A argues that a contingent-fee agreement does not pay off a debt in such a way as to trigger the anticipatory assign ment of income doctrine. Section l.B contends that whether or not the taxpayer enjoys the income should be irrelevant to a court's holding, and reveals that the courts actually disagree on whether the taxpayer realizes the income. Justice Holmes referred to "skillfully devised contracts to avoid paying wealth,"41 he meant just that. Mr. Earl attempted to reduce his income tax liability by relying on a contract with his wife to share all wealth, however acquired, equally.42 The Court refused to allow contractual arrangements to shift the tax burden from the source of the income. 43 Unlike arrangements meant to reduce tax liability, contingent-fee agreements do not attribute income to anything other than the source of the income.44 Plaintiffs do not hire lawyers with the goal of avoiding taxation on the money due them by transferring a portion of their claims to their lawyers as a gratuity.45 Some, such as the dissenters in
A. Lack of an Assignment Satisfying a Debt
Cotnam, argue these arrangements amount to an anticipatory assign ment of income because they discharge a debt to the client's attor ney.46 This argument misconstrues the contingent-fee arrangement. Attorneys have no recourse against their clients when seeking pay ment until the defendant makes good on the judgment. When plain tiffs prevail, their attorneys look solely to their portion of the judg ment, not to their client's. In fact, the whole structure of the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine rests on the notion that the taxpayer would have received the income, but f o r the assignment.47
Here [T]he recovery is determined in a dynamic process in which the exercise of the experience and skill of the attorney results both in some recovery and in an increase in the value of that recovery. The attorney creates and adds value; the efforts of the attorney contribute toindeed he may be solely responsible for -both the recovery and its augmentation. Attenu ated subtleties and refinements of title have nothing to do with the practical realities of con tingent fee agreements and the relative interests of attorney and client in any recovery that may ultimately be realized. lawsuit and earning any fee received, the plaintiff could not possibly have enjoyed the income by assigning it to the lawyer. 65 The majority of circuit courts have correctly noted this argument has little to do with whether the lawyer's fee was income as to the taxpayer.66 Few categorize the paying of bills as an enjoyable activity, yet that is not the point. The outcome should hinge on whether taxpayers control the flow of funds, no matter that they could not rightly deem many of these payments discretionary.67 Under such an analysis, the Internal Revenue Service should prevail.68 But in truth, this debate centers on when a taxpayer realizes income, which is what the Horst Court attempted to define.69 Trying to figure out when someone enjoys the benefit of the economic gain70 amounts to an attempt at objectively determining if the taxpayer controls it.71 Thus, those circuits applying the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine believe that if taxpayers can direct the funds to their lawyers, they obviously control those funds.72 Those critical of such an approach maintain this criteria falls short of satisfying the complete "dominion over the asset" language in the Supreme Court's Glenshaw Glass73 decision.74 The Fifth Circuit in Cotnam found it dismaying to argue Mrs. Cotnam controlled an asset when she could only apply the "gain" from it to a single, and not very attractive situation.75 The taxpayer's options consisted of exchanging a fraction of the amount due for a chance to reclaim the whole amount, or retaining a worthless, albeit 65. See llll complete, right to the asset.76 Therefore, even though the taxpayer could direct to whom the potential proceeds would go, she had not yet realized the gain, and once the gain did occur, the contingent-fee portion was beyond her control. "It seems intuitive that when the goal of a tax system is to subject net income to taxation, expenditures used to produce that income should be [deductible] ."77
The disagreement over the nature of a contingent-fee agreement does not, however, end with the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine, or the requisite level of control to establish dominion. The Seventh Circuit failed to acknowledge the controversy involving whether a contingent-fee agreement assigns a portion of the daim when Mr. Kenseth, the plaintiff in Kenseth v. Commissioner,78 ap pealed the decision of the Tax Court.79 In summarizing the taxpayer's claim, the court wrote: :•1n essence, Kenseth wants us to recharacterize this as a case in which he assigned 40 percent of his tort claim to the law firm. But he didn't. A contingent-fee contract is not an assignment."80 Despite the confident tone of this proclamation, the status of contingency-fee contracts remains a matter of much conten tion.81 Upon closer analysis, the circuits in the minority view contingent-fee agreements as coming harrowingly close to doing just that -assigning a part of the claim.82 In light of their opinions, they apparently feel such agreements cross the line. This Part analyzes the opinions finding the lawyer's contingency fee outside of the plaintiff's income. Section II.A concludes that the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, while avoiding saying so explicitly,S3 have con cluded contingency-fee agreements amount to a partial assignment of the claim. Section 11.B offers support for ruling contingency-fee agreements are partial assignments by considering the features of the contingency-fee agreement.
A. The Indications of a Partial Assignment
The proper categorization of contingent-fee agreements remains unclear, despite pronouncements to the contrary. Though the Seventh Circuit stated that a contingent-fee agreement is not a partial assign ment of the claim, it did not arrive at this conclusion through an inde pendent analysis.84 Instead, the opinion points out that Wisconsin law prohibits the assignment of a claim to a lawyer.85 Many states do so because the common law barred the assignment of a cause of action.86 Originally, such bars were meant to prevent the rich and landed nobility from harassing others by financing lawsuits.87 When contin gent-fee agreements first arose, the judiciary predominantly found such agreements champertous.88 Although later jurisprudence decided contingent-fee agreements were sufficiently distinguishable from 83. The Cotnam court came very close to holding so explicitly. See 88. Champerty is defined as: "I. An agreement between a stranger to a lawsuit and a litigant by which the stranger pursues the litigant's claim as consideration for receiving part of any judgement proceeds. 2. The act or fact of maintaining, supporting, or promoting another person's lawsuit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 224 (7th ed. 1999).
champerty, the courts never established a principle on which to differ entiate between them.89
In opinions granting taxpayers relief from being taxed on their attorneys' contingent fees, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits obscure the true import of their holdings by couching their arguments in terms meant to fend off attacks under Lucas and Horst.90 The opinions frequently refer to whether the taxpayer had any right to the income when it was assigned.91 Thus, the Sixth Circuit notes "the value of the taxpayer's lawsuit was entirely speculative and dependent on the services of counsel,"92 while the Fifth Circuit finds it important that the taxpayer "was a long way from having the equivalent of cash," and it "was uncertain as to whether it [the claim] had any value."93
In f a ct, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have implicitly held that plain tiffs assign a portion of their claim to the attorney upon signing a contingent-fee agreement.94 This can be difficult to discern from the cases, given that the courts themselves often seem confused about the basis and impact of their holdings.95 The Fifth Circuit in Cotnam came close to explicitly recognizing an assignment when it stated the taxpayer "in effect, assigned to her attorneys forty percent of the claim."96 The "in effect" language, however, indicates the court's unwillingness to state flatly that a partial assignment of the claim had occurred.97 In Estate of Clarks, the Sixth Circuit used a less direct ap proach stating "the client as assignor has transferred some of the Srivastava, its reasoning was considerably less clear. After discussing assignment in general, the court stated "control over that claim -the income source or 'tree' -is neither fully divested to the attorney nor fully retained by the taxpayer-client."99 This effort to characterize the transaction as a tenancy in common, after earlier having called it an assignment,100 only serves to confuse the issue. The Estate of Clarks court made a similar effort, indicating the attorney and the client had formed a partnership in order to prosecute the claim. 1 01
Whatever their reasoning, these courts clearly reject the idea that an assignment of income occurred, 1 02 unless one concludes that these courts do not think assigned income taxable unless done in an antici patory fashion meant to avoid taxation. The only coherent theory rests on the plaintiff exchanging a portion of her claim for her attorney's services. This theory, however, presents a problem. States other than Wisconsin still legally bar attorneys from receiving an assignment of part of the claim. io3 In fact, the bar was almost universal throughout the legal systems descended from the English common law.104
Describing these transfers, when the law apparently bars categorizing them as partial assignments, remains a dilemma.
Faced with this quandary, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have sided with reality, treating the contingent-fee agreement as a partial transfer. The well-intentioned but dubious notion that preventing law yers from acquiring causes of action will reduce frivolous lawsuits against the innocent1 05 should not impede the use of contingency fee agreements. cannot afford the great cost of litigating the matter in court.106 For the legal system to fulfill its societal function it must hold wrongdoers accountable for their actions.1 0 7 Access to justice requires the availability of contingent-fee agreements, as does the State's ability to influence behavior through the granting of private rights of action.108
So in the name of equity, and in the interest of society, courts give a wink and a nod toward contingent-f e e contracts -and even enforce them.1 0 9 Courts do so despite the fact these contracts assign part of the claim and give attorneys rights even when, under a pure contingent f e e agreement, they would have none.11 0
The best indicator that the partial assignment of the claim argu ment needs careful attention is how the courts that deny that a partial assignment occurred have insisted on treating the issue. Thus, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits almost completely disregard that which so many other courts feign so much interest in. On appeal, the Srivastava Court found Cotnam indistinguishable from the case at bar, despite Texas attorneys' rights being wholly derivative of their clients' rights.11 6 As noted earlier, the Sixth Circuit in Estate of Clarks glossed over any differences in attorney-charging statutes saying Alabama'ssupposedly highly distinguishable11 7 -statute and Michigan's com mon law version were "more or less" the same.118 In fact, when Kenseth tried to use this approach with the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner tartly replied that every state, to his knowledge, gave the attorney "a lien on the proceeds of any settlement or judgment to the extent of the contingent fee."119
B. The Case for Partial Assignment of the Claim
Because contingent-fee agreements transfer so much control over the handling of a claim, it is difficult to argue that the plaintiff trans fers a mere interest in the judgment to the attorney. The exact level of control an attorney exercises over a claim upon accepting a case 114. Davis, supra note 39, at 1716. 115. The narrow ground being the specific statute at issue in Cotnam remains a subject of debate.120 The fact that the attorney gains a great deal of control at the signing of a contingent-fee contract, however, stands as a given. Those not qualified to press their own claims hire attorneys familiar with the system and capable of working within it to achieve a particular goal.121 The attorney is the expert in this situation, estimating the claim's worth,122 and determining how to handle discov ery and pretrial.123 The client will generally defer to the attorney on trial strategy, and even on whether or not to accept or rej ect settle ment offers.124 Clients generally do not have any concept of what a reasonable fee should be, or what the lawyer's fee will be in the end.125 Practically speaking, the attorney's de facto level of control is almost total.
The counter argument that the ultimate control over the suit remains with the plaintiff-client fails to adequately consider the reality of the situation. Those who do not wish to view contingency-fee lawsuits as partial assignments of the claim dismiss lack of control arguments. Yet this right often proves illusory in practice. The contingent-fee lawyer dropped from a case does not go away empty handed.128 Courts routinely handle such situations by forcing the client to reimburse the fired attorney at an hourly rate for any work already done on the case.129 Other courts willingly enforce the contingent-fee contract, granting the lawyer whatever share the agreement calls for out of the final judgment.130 One court went so far as to allow the lawyer to press the claim even after the client no longer wished to pursue it,131 while another stated if a partial assignment did occur, the attorney had a right against being discharged.132 To maintain that the client still re tains control in such situations reduces control to a theoretical, rather than an actual, right. Control is of little practical consequence when its exercise would cause two sets of lawyers' fees to eat up the entire award. Add to this the fact that the courts advocating the ultimate control theory also force taxpayers to pay taxes on both their share and the attorneys' contingent fees, and one can easily see why any client who needs the money in controversy cannot possibly afford to switch attorneys in most situations. 133 To clarify the nature of these agreements, it proves useful to con sider how the contingent-fee contracts themselves address ownership of the claim issues. The contract at issue in Srivastava stated the client agreed to "sell, transfer, assign and convey to my said attorneys the re spective undivided interests in and to my said claim."134 Attorneys also routinely include language to retain control over settlement talks.135 Because of a real possibility the lawyer's and client's interests will U. PUB. L. REV. 477, 487 (2001 ) (maintaining clients retain a high level of actual control be cause they can always discharge the lawyer).
128. See 150. Cf. Painter, supra note 81, at 671 -74, 691 (claiming lawyers have an informational advantage over client). While such acts may be unethical, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (1983), pretending they do not occur helps no one -except the unethical lawyers.
151. See, e.g. , Schneyer, supra note 89, at 389 n.76 (discussing a study claiming New York personal injury lawyers tend to tell their clients the defendant offered less than they truly did, then later reveal this higher number as a second offer and persuade the client to take it (citing DOUGLAS ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 110-1 1 (1974))). unsaid, or stated with little further attention, if not an anticipatory assignment of income, the transaction must be a partial assignment of the claim itself.158 These federal courts find it galling to make plaintiffs pay taxes on the portion of their claims surrendered for the privilege of vindicating their rights. 159 If, however, the plaintiff has in fact assigned a portion of the claim to his attorney, this assignment also has tax consequences.160 Because this matter ultimately turns on a tax issue, one should remember the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") traditionally· looks to the substaqce of a transaction, deeming the form utilized irrelevant to tax liability.161
If one accepts that a partial assignment occurred, then applicable case law exists to deal with this situation.162 While the anticipatory assign ment of income doctrine does not apply, the anticipation of income 164. While the client could conceivably get the claim back, see, e. g. , Chase v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (stating plaintiff has to pay fired attorney at hourly rate but will get entire judgment for himself), it will not return in the normal course of events, cf. Evans v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 40 (1970) (placing repeated emphasis on the fact that the taxpayer transferred everything he had, not just the right to interest). While the court may in effect force the attorney to sell that portion of the claim back, the client will have to pay to get it back. See Chase, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 385. Provisions for a buyback upon the occurrence of a given event do not prevent recognizing that a transfer occurred. 
A. Section 83 Mainly Applicable to the Employee-Attorney
The solution proposed by some scholars, to tax the transfer under section 83,170 would fail to adequately address the problem at hand. Though section 83 deals with the transfer of property for services,171 it was not designed for the contingent-fee situation. Section 83 deals with employers' payments to employees or independent contractors.172 While this section might seem to apply at first, a careful reading of the language implies otherwise.173 Consider that section 83 deals mainly with the tax consequences of receiving income not redeemable until sometime in the future.174 The main proponent of applying section 83 ance agent who purchased other agents' rights to renewal commissions is taxed as those agents would be).
167. See Hickel, supra note 127, at 498 (advocating applying the Raytheon "in lieu of' test).
168. See Hort, 313 U.S. at 31 ("Where ... the disputed amount was essentially a substi tute for rental payments ... it must be regarded as ordinary income .... ").
169. See Hickel, supra note 127, at 495-96 (describing the difficulty ensuing because the cause of action does not have a definite value). 181. See Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 24, 36 (1987) (finding man who spent sixty to eighty hours a week gambling was in the trade or business of gambling); Olson, supra note 77, at 1208-10 (sustaining IRS's contention that horse breeding operation was not a business because no true business would operate at such losses for such a long time, and it must there fore be an operation not engaged in for profit under § 183). But see id. at 1209 n.57 (saying taxpayers who use business-like methods will almost always be found to be in trade or busi ness because of good faith standard).
182. See Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 35 ("to be engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity .... ").
183. See Once the attorney and client sign the contingent-fee agreement, a substantial risk of forfeiture no longer exists. 209 The law barring poten tial plaintiffs from assigning their claims to attorneys developed because policy makers judged it unwise to give lawyers that level of control over a claim.210 Applying section 83, however, indicates an acceptance of the proposition that such an assignment did occur. To then turn around and then argue a substantial risk of forfeiture exists seems, at the least, inconsistent. If clients fire their lawyers for anything but cause, the courts wilt order reimbursement of either the entire contingent fee specified in the contract, or at the very least at an hourly rate.211 And if the court decides to base its decision on whether a substantial amount of work was still required, this would necessitate a case-by-case analysis. Although ethical rules often prohibit taking cases .on a contingent-fee basis when the case will require very little work and when such an arrangement is clearly not in the client's best interest,212 not all lawyers walk the straight and narrow in this regard.213 With an individual analysis, the claim could vest immediately upon signing for cases requiring very little work, or well into trial preparation for cases necessitating more work. Despite all this, the fact remains that the lawyers will collect a fee in all cases except where they quit or are discharged for cause.214 C. Barter Analysis: Th e Better Approach
The case against using section 83 to approach the tax repercussions of contingent-fee agreements becomes even clearer when one consid ers that an alternative method more closely fits the facts and allows for . Those who view contingent-fee plaintiffs and hourly-fee plaintiffs as similarly situated have a strange notion of similar. First, lawyers in many fields simply refuse to take a case on an hourly basis. Sec ond, anyone who can afford an attorney at an hourly rate is by no means similarly situated to those forced to use contingent-fee lawyers. Finally, if the wealthy believe giving up 30-50% of their award to a lawyer produces tax benefits justifying the cost, they should not have any trouble finding a lawyer to accommodate them. The Internal Revenue Service should tax plaintiffs on the amount they actually received from their attorneys in exchange for a portion of their claims. If an attorney charges $250 per hour and spent 100 hours on the case, the client received a benefit of $25,000.237 To argue that because the attorney actually receives one million dollars that this amount was the benefit to his client borders on the absurd.238 It also demonstrates that a partial assignment occurred.239 Otherwise the 229. See id. at 282 (finding that thirty-nine of forty-three contingent-fee lawyers had the information necessary to estimate effective hourly rate -including billable hours).
230. "Experience tells us that a presumption of equality is simply not appropriate in many barter transactions. Often one side outbargains the other and in no sense can it be said the two sides of the exchange are equal." Keller "owner" of the claim could dismiss the attorney on the eve of victory.24° Courts do not allow this because they realize in a suit for restitution, the attorney would lose $975,000.241 The attorney outbargained the client. For the government to tax plaintiffs, not on the fair market value of what they received, but on the fair market value of what they gave up, adds insult to injury.
CONCLUSION
The circuits disagree about the propriety of allowing plaintiffs to assign a portion of their claim to an attorney. These concerns consti tute a historical artifact, the pressing issues of the Middle Ages gumming up the judicial machinery of the twenty-first century. Recognizing that lawyers largely control the course and outcome of suits and settlements will allow courts to respond to the reality of the situation instead of how they think the system should work. Partial assignments of the claim already exist, and to call them a lien on the judgment changes nothing. The government allegedly levies taxes on the fair market value of what the taxpayer receives. Here, taxpayers receive legal services in exchange for a part of their claim and should have to pay taxes on this amount. The taxpayers do not, nor will they ever, receive the full portion going to the attorney. The fact they once had a right to this amount does not change the reality they will never realize the gain. Esau sold his birthright to Jacob for a pottage of lentils.242 Esau should have been taxed on the value of the lentils received, while Jacob should have been taxed based on the value of Isaac's estate.
240. See Painter, supra note 81, at 674 n.223 (discussing clients who discharge their at· torneys "on the courthouse steps").
241. See id. (noting that in such situations the quantum meruit award should equal the agreed upon fee).
242. Genesis 25: 29-34.
